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SOME CLARIFICATIONS IN THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL
PAPER UNDER THE PROPOSED UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
By FAIRFAX LEARY, JR. t
For several years the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Law Institute have been jointly engaged in the prepara-
tion of a Uniform Commercial Code. Present plans call for its sub-
mission to the legislatures in 1950. Prior to that time its provisions
should undergo extensive scrutiny by the legal profession so that the
final product can reflect the best solutions of the problems in the law of
commercial paper. The scheme of the Code has been outlined else-
where." Article III of the Code is entitled "Commercial Paper" and
covers the law of bills, notes and checks, together with provisions
governing bank collections.
While a complete survey of Article III is beyond the scope of this
paper, an exploration of some of the areas of conflict now clarified by
express provisions of the Code can be attempted. Dean Beutel has
noted over seventy instances of divided authority 2 under the "act to
establish a law uniform with the laws of other states" on the subject of
negotiable instruments, hereinafter called the N. I. L. The positions
taken on some of these matters in the proposed Uniform Commercial
Code, hereinafter called the Code, will be discussed in this and sub-
sequent articles. This paper will cover only the scope of Article
III, some provisions settling conflicts as to formal requisites, and some
changes suggested in the rules governing indorsement.
t A. B., 1932, Princeton University; LL. B., 1935, Harvard University; member
of the bars of New York and District of Columbia; Assistant Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
1. Lewis, The Propsed New Commercial Code, 20 PA. B. A. Q 131 (1949);
Beers, The New Commercial Code, 32 J. AM. JuD. Soc' ". 107 (1948) ; Witherspoon,
Proposed Steps Toward Uniformity, 53 Com. L. J. 3 (1948) ; Gilmore, On the Diflcul-
ties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YAIa L. J. 1341 (1948) ; Beers, New Steps
Toward Uniformity--The Commercial Code, 20 CoNN. B. J. 80 (1948). The plan
envisages separate articles governing Sales, Commercial Paper, Foreign Banking (in-
cluding letters of credit), Investment Securities, Documents of Title and Chattel
Security.
The citations to the Code herein are, unless otherwise specified, from Article III,
Proposed Final Draft No. 2, as submitted to the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws at the 1948 annual meeting. It is understood that some
changes in certain aspects of the Draft are contemplated, but the core is ripe for dis-
cussion.
2. Beutel, Problems of Interpretation Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, 27
NEB. L. REv. 485, 495 (1948).
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SCOPE OF ARTICLE III
The scope of the Commercial Paper article is narrower in some
respects than the N. I. L. and broader in others. It is narrower in
that it does not purport to cover all types of negotiable instruments
and it is broader in that there are express provisions governing the
liability of drawees to drawers and vice versa, a considerable area on
which the N. I. L. was silent.
Investment Securities
One of the greatest difficulties of the N. I. L. was its all-inclusive
coverage. Section one begins, "An instrument to be negotiable must
conform to the following requirements.--" Taken literally the re-
quirements must be met no matter what type of instrument may be
involved. The implication is reinforced in the case of corporate secu-
rities by the provision in Section 65 expressly providing that the war-
ranties there specified are not made by persons negotiating public or
corporation securities. This has caused considerable difficulty in the
case of the corporate bond or debenture.' The long term loan in which
many lenders participate in the obligation of one borrower, whose
borrowings normally are for the purpose of acquiring capital assets,
certainly raises problems of a different nature from those involved in
financing sales of finished product as in the case of the time bill of
exchange, or in the case of borrowings for working capital from a
single lender. And clearly the corporate bond and mortgage should
be in a different category from the check, the instrument of payment,
or the sight draft with bill of lading attached.
For example, in addition to several areas of difficulty over formal
requisites,4 there is a real need for group action on the part of all bond
holders if the corporation should default, and to be effective every-
where, the necessary conditions should appear in the bond.5 On policy
there may well be a need for preserving some maker defenses, and
3. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED 7 et seq. (4th ed.,
Chafee, 1926). But see id. at 210 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948). See also Steffen, A Proposed
Uniform Act Making Investment Instruments Negotiable, 34 COL. L. Rv. 632 (1934).
4. See, e. g., King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798 (1924)
(bond stating that it was "issued under . . . and subject to an indenture . . .
held non-negotiable because not an unconditional promise) ; Manker v. American Sav-
ings Bank and Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 406 (1924) (municipal local im-
provement bonds providing that holders had no claim against the city "except from the
special assessment made for the improvement for which said bond was issued . . "
held non-negotiable because the promise was to pay out of a particular fund and hence
was not unconditional). See Steffen & Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds,
41 YALE L. J. 799 (1932).
5. Compare cases such as Guilford v. Minneapolis, S. Ste. M. & A. Ry., 48 Minn.
560. 51 N. W. 658 (1891), suith Allan v. Moline Plow Co., 14 F. 2d 912 (8th Cir.
1926). On whether the average investor pays any attention to such clauses, see the
realistic remarks of Learned Hand, J., in Babbit v. Read, 236 Fed. 42, 44 (2d Cir.
1916).
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perhaps even the "no action" clause in the indenture of trust securing
the issue.6 On the other hand, free transferability cutting off owner-
ship claims of holders is necessary for the operation of a securities
market. The result 'has been a conflict in decisions and technical
interpretations as in Enoch v. Brandon,7 where the New York Court
of Appeals ruled that the promise was not rendered conditional by
a clause in the bond referring to a mortgage in these words:
"to which reference is hereby made for a description of the property
mortgaged and pledged, the nature and extent of the security, the
rights of the holders of the bonds with respect thereto, the manner
in which notice may be given to such holders and the terms and condi-
tions upon which said bonds are issued and secured." (Emphasis
supplied.)
British courts have had greater freedom since their statute was
more clearly an act relating to bills, notes and checks." There is
considerable Sorce to the argument that from its entire context the
N. I. L. should be similarly limited to bills, notes and checks. The
reference in Section 65 to public or corporation securities could be
treated as too incidental to require that the development of various
forms of corporate securities be required to fit the Procrustean bed of
the formal requisites of the N. I. L. Nevertheless, the weight of
authority is against such an argument. Before the decision in Enoch
v. Brandon, interim certificates entitling ihe holder to a definitive bond,
when and as issued, came before the New York courts in Manhattan
Co. v. Morgan,9 and were ruled not negotiable. Both cases involved
the ownership claim of a prior holder. The felt need for at least a
quasi-negotiability that would promote transferability by cutting off
such ownership claims resulted in the passage of the Hofstader Act
in New York,1" specifically giving these attributes of negotiability to
interim certificates.
Despite the possibility that a line could be drawn between the
clauses used in King Cattle Co. v. Joseph," where the bond was ruled
6. See Rittenhouse v. Lukens Steel Co., 116 Pa. Super. 303, 310, 176 Atl. 543, 546
(1935), where the court said: "If the plaintiff were permitted to tie up the quick
assets of the corporation, the ability of the corporation to carry on its business would
be destoyed." But is it not possible to regard all bondholders as equal venturers in
the corporate enterprise who should, as in admiralty, share the loss equally when their
ship is grounded on the shoals of financial trouble?
7. 249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E. 45 (1928).
8. The act is entitled "An act to codify the law relating to Bills of Exchange,
Cheques, and Promissory Notes." See BYLES ON BiLLs 158 (20th ed., Welford, 1939);
Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank, [1898] 2 Q. B. 658.
9. 242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926).
10. N. Y. PERS. PRop. LAw, Art. 8, § 260 et seq.
11. 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798 (1924). See note 4 supra for the wording of
the clause.
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to be non-negotiable and the wording before the court in Enoch v.
Br-andon, counsel advising on the negotiability of bond issues was not
in a comfortable position. Minor differences in wording might lead
to differentiation from precedent and counsel felt that where such large
sums were involved a safer basis for action was necessary. Accord-
ingly, the Hofstader Act was amended to cover the corporate bond
specifically. These same pressures also resulted in similar statutes
elsewhere.'2
Consequently, in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code, decision
was early made to treat separately the two classes of instruments, com-
mercial paper on the one hand, and investment securities on the other.
The proper demarcation could not be made along economic lines based
upon the use of the proceeds, whether for capital assets or for working
capital or financing sales. The simple promissory note given to a bank
could well be used for evidencing a capital loan to a small business.
Indeed, a relatively recent development in bank lending is the term
loan to larger enterprises for capital purposes.'" The decision, there-
fore, was to differentiate on the basis of whether the investment
market was being tapped or the usual sources of commercial finance
were being used. Naturally, the distinction could not be drawn on the
basis of the market originally tapped for the funds, as this might not
be apparent to subsequent purchasers. An objective test based upon
the type of the instrument was necessary. Bonds, stocks, debentures
were clearly to be covered, and the all-inclusive test adopted was to
classify as an investment security every obligation which was one
of a class evidencing a share in property in an enterprise or in
an issuer's obligation.' 4 Article III, therefore, specifically excludes
12. N. Y. PmEs. PROP. LAW, Art. 8, §§ 260, 262. Pennsylvania has the original
statute. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 56, § 511 et seq. (Purdon, 1930). California, Canal Zone
and Nevada have variously amended N. I. L. 184 to cover the same problem. See
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 201 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948). More spe-
cialized statutes have also been enacted. Kentucky in its statute governing the issue
of securities by rural electric cooperative corporations, provides "All obligations and
interest coupons issued pursant to this chapter shall be negotiable instruments." Ky.
Rlv. STAT. §279.130 (1948). Alabama has a similar provision for obligations of
Electric Membership Corporations. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 18, § 22 (1940).
13. See JAcOBY & SAULNIER, TERM LENDING TO BusiNass (1942) passim; Holt-
hausen, Term Lending to Business by Commercial Banks in 1946, 33 FED. Rs. BULL.
498 (1947).
14. COMMERCIAL CODE, Art. V, § 1 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2), defining a se-
curity as "an instrument in bearer or registered form of a type commonly dealt in upon
securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area, in which it is
issued or dealt in as a medium of investment if
(a) it is either one of a class or by its terms is divisible into a class of instru-
ments; and
(b) it evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enter-
prise or the issuer's obligation on the instrument."
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from its scope Investment Securities as defined in Article V of the
Code. 5
Negotiability by Contract
Study of the proper scope of a Code covering Commercial Paper
led to the conclusion that aside from Investment Securities, no other
form of instrument for the payment of money was properly pressing
for inclusion in the field of negotiable instruments. 6 Nevertheless,
Article III opens with language less inclusive than the N. I. L., by
stating that "Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this
Article must. . . ." Contrast this with the former wording "An
instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following require-
ments: . . ." A negative inference can be drawn from the opening
lines of Section 102 of Article III of the Code that there is no neces-
sary legislative prohibition against recognition of new types' of nego-
tiable instruments. But Section 102 (2) expressly provides that
"A writing which does not conform to the requirements of
this Section * * * is not a negotiable instrument within this
Article and cannot be made one by contract or by conduct."
This last provision is intended specifically to preclude "nego-
tiability by contract" or by the insertion of clauses waiving defenses,
and the like. As a part of the same plan to exclude attempts to secure
negotiability for writings that in substance are conditional sales,
chattel mortgages or other types of security devices, Section 102 (1)
(b) provides that the instrument must
"contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain
in money and no other promise, order, obligation or power. given
by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article. .. ."
The continual reference to "within this Article" of course permits some
attributes of negotiability to be given documents of title and Invest-
ment Securities, but equally it may not clearly preclude like common-
law treatment of other writings under various theories of estoppel.
15. Section 102(2), "A writing which does not conform to the requirements of
this Section or which falls within the scope of Article V on Investment Securities is
not a negotiable instrument within this Article and cannot be made one by contract or
by conduct."
16. See text at note 63 infra for a modification of the definition of unconditional
promise or order to permit commercial paper of governmental bodies to be limited to
the proceeds of a particular source.
17. For example, an express agreement not to raise defenses against an assignee
in order to permit financing of the contract was upheld in Elzey v. Ajax Heating Co.,
10 N. J. Misc. 281, 158 AtI. 851 (Sup. Ct. 1932), where the defense was breach of
warranty. The cases seem to turn on the distinction between mere breach of war-
ranty or failure of consideration where the clause is upheld and a total absence of con-
sideration or fraud, where such clauses are generally ruled to be ineffective. Corn-
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Certain provisions relating to security arrangements have a legiti-
mate place in commercial paper. Although Section 102 (1) b of the
Code provides that a negotiable instrument may not contain any
promise, order, obligation or power not expressly authorized, Section
111, entitled "Terms and Omissions Not Affecting Negotiability,"
permits a clause stating that security has been given and may be sold
upon default, a clause confessing judgment at or after maturity, and
a term waiving the benefits of any law intended for the advantage or
protection of the obligor.
The Code drafters attempted to clean up negotiable paper, and
have all security arrangements covered by separate agreement,18 but
this could not be accomplished.
In any event, it was found that the difficulties arose under in-
stalment sales and in the attempts' of their finance companies to
secure a holder in due course status, divorced from the underlying
transaction.1" The finance companies' desire to be able to collect
free of defenses of non-delivery of the goods, failure of considera-
tion, and breach of warranty and the like, conflicted with their
desire for a secured position and the right to repossess the goods upon
default. These contracts are normally found in the field of consumer
finance, and the known disparity in bargaining power between the
consumer and the instalment seller, justifies protection of the consumer.
On the other hand, terms not justified in contracts of instalment sale to
the ultimate consumer are justifiable when included in the note evi-
dencing a broker's "day loan" or a borrowing of "call money" by a
business man from a banker. A part of the feeling against high pres-
sure salesmanship may also have influenced the continuation in a few
pare United States v. Troy-Parisian, 115 F. 2d 224 (9th Cir. 1940) (breach of
warranty, clause upheld), with Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co.,
117 F. 2d 442 (6th Cir. 1941) (fraud, clause not enforceable). Where an estoppel
certificate accompanies a negotiable note the maxim, "Methinks the lady doth protest
too much" seems applicable. On the other hand, compare the very general practice of
taking an estoppel certificate in an assignment of a real property mortgage. WALSH,
MORTGAGES 256-58 (1934). See Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. REV. 205
(1943). Of course any such trickery as a contract made on one piece of paper with
no express warranty and a separate contract of warranty on a second page will not be
successful. See E. Z. Heating Co. v. Rubin, 107 Pa. Super. 105, 163 Atl. 335 (1932).
18. Llewellyn, The Case for a Court Security Agreement, 40 BANKING 50
(1948).
19. The cases generally cited as horrible examples of attempts to create negotia-
bility for complicated contracts often involve installment sales to ultimate consumers.
E. g., Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Shiplett-Moloney Co., 316 Ill. App. 79, 43 N. E.
2d 857 (1942) (sale of tractor to farmer, note held negotiable, actually a conditional
sales contract) ; Akron Auto Finance Co. v. Stonebraker, 66 Ohio App. 507, 35 N. E.
2d 585 (1941) (retail sale of automobile Cognovit Note and Chattel Mortgage in one
paper, note accelerable upon breach of any of the "covenants" of the mortgage, held
non-negotiable). Cf. Note, Negotiability of Conditional Sales Contracts, 57 YALE L.
J. 1414 (1948).
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jurisdictions under the N. I. L. of the Massachusetts rule making title
retaining notes non-negotiable,2" and decisions finding that the
promise is made conditional by a reference to another contract.2 Pro-
tection has also been given the instalment purchaser under decisions
denying holder in due course status to the finance company by reason
of the intimate relationship with the seller.21a
A more direct approach would exclude from negotiability all instru-
ments which are subject to requirements of public filing or recording
as a condition of the validity as against creditors of or purchasers from
the obligor of any clause or provision therein.22 Such a provision will,
it is understood, be proposed for inclusion at the next meeting of the
American Law Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Its inclusion will permit some greater latitude in security
clauses in other instruments.
Relation of Drawer and Drawee
Although on several principal points, the new Code will be nar-
rower in coverage than the N. I. L., several new areas are also covered.
The main new area is the contract between drawer and drawee.
Although some provisions with respect to "cover" by the drawer
are found in foreign codes,23 the contract between drawer and drawee
was not mentioned in the N. I. L. The N. I. L. did have two pro-
visions governing the problem indirectly. Under Section 61 a drawer
engages that on due presentment the instrument will be accepted
or paid or both, and if necessary proceedings upon dishonor are
20. E. g., Pierce, Butler and Pierce Mfg. Corp. v. Russell Boiler Works, 262 Mass.
242, 159 N. E. 625 (1928).
21. See note 63 infra.
21a. Some of the cases are collected in Note, 57 YALE L. J. 1414, 1415 n. 8 (1948).
22. Filing or recording of lien or title retaining interests in automobiles is re-
quired either by the various conditional sales and chattel mortgage acts or by motor
vehicle codes in all but five states, and possibly a sixth, Pennsylvania, where the bail-
ment lease is valid without filing. In most states, filing or recording is required for
such chattel security devices. The drafts of the Chattel Security Article of the Code
on this point are not as yet published.
23. In French law, for example, CODE DE COMMERCE, Art. 116, modifi6 par le
d~cret-loi du 30 Octobre 1935. See PERCEROU & BOUTERON, LA NOUVELLE LEGISLATION
FRANgAISE ET INTERNATIONALE DE LA LETTR DE CHANGE, Du BILT A ORDE ET Du
CHiPQUE 26 et seq. (1937). Of course the provision that title to the cover passes by
operation of law to the holder is in part inconsistent with the Anglo-American idea
that a bill is not of itself an assignment. See Code, Section 502. Professor Jitta in a
report preceding the Geneva Conference of 1930 points out that it is hardly necessary
to specify an obligation to provide cover where the drawer is a guarantor of acceptance
and payment unless title to any cover is to pass to the holder. Despite the argument
that such a provision greatly increases the value of a bill Jitta regarded the matter as
more properly a part of the law of bankruptcy. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENT
C. 487, M. 203, 1923, I, 38 et seq. Of nine nations then answering a questionnaire on
the subject four desired that title to cover should pass to the holder; four did not and
one was doubtful.
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taken the drawer will pay the amount of the instrument. Sections
79 and 114 (4) make the drawer liable without necessity for present-
ment or notice of dishonor where he has no reason to expect or require
that the instrument be accepted or paid. Where a drawer has failed
to provide cover, it is perhaps better to hold him liable on the instru-
ment without necessity for presentment, protest, and notice than to
create a warranty that cover has been provided. Such a warranty
would be broken when made so that the statute of limitations would
run from the time of issue, not the time of dishonor.24 The same
scope of the drawer's liability is, therefore, retained in the new Code.25
But a congeries of separate statutes and much common law has
heretofore governed the liability of the drawee to drawer and the
drawer's duty to the drawee.
The Code regulates this situation in several sections. The first
of these, Section 507,26 delineates the basic contract of drawer and
drawee and the essential stipulations that govern in the absence of
agreement otherwise. Basic is the engagement of the drawee to the
drawer that, when a credit is extended subject to drawings, the drawee
will pay to the holder on due presentment all bills drawn in accordance
with the understanding and properly indorsed, and will accept all such
bills not payable on demand.
24. See, e. 9, Moody v. Morris-Roberts Co., 38 Ida. 414, 226 Pac. 278 (1923).
25. Section 506(2), "The drawer engages that if the bill is not accepted or paid
or both he will pay its amount to the holder or to any indorser who pays it, provided
there has been any necessary presentment, notice of dishonor and protest. By draw-
ig without recourse the drawer disclaims this liability."
26. "Section 507. CONTRACT OF DRAWvER WITH DRAWEE.
"(1) Unless otherwise agreed a person who extends a credit subject to bills drawn
against it engages until the credit is exhausted to pay to the holder on due present-
ment all bills drawn in accordance with the understanding and properly indorsed and
to accept al such bills not payable on demand.
"(2) Unless otherwise agreed bills may be accepted in any order convenient to
the drawee.
"(3) Upon proper payment of a bill or certification of a check the drawee may
charge the account of the drawer.
"(4) A drawee who in good faith makes payment to the holder may charge the
account of the drawer
"(a) according to the original tenor of an altered instrument; or
"(b) according to the completion of an incomplete instrument, even though he
knows it was originally incomplete.
"(5) The undertaking of a bank to pay a check is limited to a period of six
months after its date unless its terms extend the period. Thereafter in the absence of
an effective stop order the bank may at its option pay the instrument.
"(6) A drawee paying an instrument which it may not charge to the drawer's
account is subrogated to the rights against prior parties of the holder who has received
the payment and to the rights of the drawer, the payee and any subsequent party
against such holder arising either on the instrument or out of the transaction in which
it was issued or transferred. There is no election of remedies, but the drawee may
have only one satisfaction."
362 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
As certification for many purposes is acceptance, the undertaking
to accept only bills not payable on demand adopts the rule of Wachtel
v. Rosen,2 that a bank is under no obligation to certify a check, but
that rule is also enunciated expressly in Section 504 (2) relating
specifically to checks. The rule appears to be extended, however, by
the implication of Section 507, limiting the agreement to accept to bills
not payable on demand, to sight drafts and demand bills whether drawn
on a bank or on a private drawee.
Charge to the Drawer's Account: With respect to the right of
charge to the account of the drawer, Section 507 of the Code provides
that the drawee may charge the account upon payment of a bill or
certification of a check. The implication is clear that no such charge
may be made upon the acceptance of a bill, the intention apparently
being that acceptance of bills drawn, for example, under a letter of
credit, does not authorize a charge to account. As the relevant sub-
section does not open with "Unless otherwise agreed" the rule is not
variable by contract. By definition, however, a check is a bill drawn
on a bank and payable on demand.29 Consequently a sight draft drawn
on a bank is by implication at least a check, and since the basic agree-
ment provisions of the section are subject to variation by contract,
a drawee bank could agree to accept bills payable on demand. Should
such a draft be accepted, it would follow that an immediate right of
charge would accrue to the drawee. Of course, it could be argued that
while a check is a bill payable on demand drawn on a bank, not all
demand bills drawn on banks are checks, and reliance could be placed
upon the phrase, "Unless the context otherwise requires" in the open-
ing clause of Section 102 (3) defining a check. The situation is not
one of frequent occurrence, and, since a payment of a sight draft could
have been made and charged to account, acceptance should have the
same effect. More serious perhaps is the consequence that the drawer
and all prior indorsers might be discharged by acceptance of a sight
draft drawn on a bank, since the Code abolishes the former distinction
between certification at the holder's request which did discharge prior
parties, and certification at the drawer's request which did not."
27. N. I. L. § 187. Code Section 504 provides:
"(1) Certification of a check is acceptance, but discharges the drawer and
indorsers from all prior liability on the check.
"(2) Unless otherwise agreed a bank has no obligation to certify a check."
28. 249 N. Y. 386, 164 N. E. 326 (1928).
29. Section 102(3) : "Unless the context otherwise requires a writing which com-
plies with the requirements of this Section is . . . (c) A 'check' if it is a bill drawn
on a bank and payable on demand; . .
30. See note 27 mspra. This changes the law, but payees desiring the added lia-
bility of the drawer can obtain his accommodation endorsement.
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In the sections relating to bank collections it is provided that a
bank may charge its customer's account with the items received in a
single day in any order convenient to the bank. But it must charge
all of the items received on any one day before charging items received
on a subsequent day,"' whereas under Section 507 bills may be accepted
in any order convenient to the drawee, with no limitation as to the day
of presentment. Since under Section 607 (1) acceptance may be de-
ferred without dishonor until the close of the next business day follow-
ing presentment, some latitude as to acceptance is given the drawee.
Where a draft is drawn under a letter of credit, by the terms of Article
IV specifically governing letters of credit, acceptance can be deferred
for three days without dishonor.32 At first sight this might appear
to give undue latitude to the drawee, but since the drawee-acceptor of
a bill is most usually a buyer, he should be able to decide what obliga-
tions he will dishonor. Where a bank is the drawee under a letter of
credit or other agreement to accept, a more doubtful issue is raised.
However, the bank will in all probability always take the instructions
of its customer, and the rule, therefore, should be the same.
The Code settles one minor split of authority on the order of
charge to the account. Suppose three checks are simultaneously
presented, and in total they overdraw the account, but any two may
be paid. Which one should be returned? At common law there was
some authority apparently requiring all to be returned.3 Since under
the Code, Section 507, the undertaking is to pay until the credit is
exhausted, and since charge may be made in any order convenient to
the drawee, upon the simultaneous presentment of several checks,
which in the aggregate overdraw the account, the drawee must pay
some of them. Any regulation of the order of selection in this event
seems too great a regulation of minutiae and an invitation to litigation
should a rushed bank clerk improperly select the checks to be returned.
31. Code § 737(2), "A payor bank may charge against the drawer's account the
items received in a single day in any order convenient to the bank, but must charge all
of the items received on any one day before charging items received on a subsequent day.
A demand or unmatured claim against its depositor which the bank calls or acceler-
ates for set off against the depositor's account has the effect of an item received on
the day of the call or acceleration."
32. COMMERCIAL CODE, Art. IV, § 15(1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1).
33. 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING § 354 (6th ed. 1928) flatly states that in cases
of simultaneous presentment, the bank must pay all or none. See Louisville & N. R.
R. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 157 Tenn. 497, 503, 10 S. W. 2d 683, 685 (1928) (dictum
accord). On the other hand, Castaline v. Nat. City Bank of Chelsea, 249 Mass. 192,
143 N. E. 832 (1924) ; Reinisch v. Consolidated Nat. Bank, 45 Pa. Super. 236 (1911) ;
6 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3754 (1936 ed.) enunciate the rule that the bank
must pay such items in any order it may choose until funds in the account are ex-
hausted.
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Overdue Checks: The problem of the "stale" check has, on oc-
casion, proved bothersome. At some point of time, even at common
law, a check became sufficiently overdue so that a payment might not
be made in good faith. 4 In any event, a bank refusing to pay a "stale"
check should be protected from a claim that it has broken its contract
with the drawer.35 Stale check statutes have been adopted in twenty-
six jurisdictions, fifteen adopting a one year limitation and eleven a
six months limitation." The Code selects the shorter limitation as
being far more consonant with the rule requiring prompt presentment
of checks lest the drawer be discharged to the extent of the loss.
37
The general feeling, too, is that a check six months old is properly
suspect.33  As an operating matter it will be far easier to catch a check
six months old because of the difference in the name of the month,
than it will a check stale by a year or more, where the only difference
from a good check is the last digit in the year. Protection is given
the paying bank even under the six months limitation for the Code
expressly provides that, in the absence of an effective stop order the
bank may at its option pay stale checks.39 As between the bank and
the drawer this provision seems sound. The drawer has issued the
check and is in a position to protect himself by giving the bank a stop
order. A clause protecting the bank only when payment of a stale
check was made through mistake or inadvertence would only be an
invitation to litigation on this issue. Also, the bank may well be in
a position to know that the drawer wishes the particular check paid.
Right to Stop Payment: The drawer's right to stop payment was
also not regulated under the N. I. L., but has been the cause of much
litigation and some statutory provisions.
Section 508 on stopping payment first states the general right
of the drawer by timely action to stop payment on a check not yet ac-
34. Morrison v. McCartney, 30 Mo. 183 (1860) ; Lancaster Bank v. Woodward,
18 Pa. 357 (1852).
35. Commercial Investment Trust v. Lundgren-Wittensten Co., 173 Minn. 83, 216
N. W. 531 (1927); Peninsula Nat. Bank v. Hans Pederson Co., 91 Wash. 621, 158
Pac. 246 (1916).
36. One year, e. g., N. J. Rav. STAT., § 7:5-10 (1937): Similar statutes exist in
District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New Mex-
ico, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
Six months, e. g., CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 652, § 16e (Deering, 1937) : Similar stat-
utes exist in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina, Oregon and Utah.
37. N. I. L. § 186, Code Sections 602(2), 604(1) (c).
38. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 150 (4th ed. 1937) ; cf. 6
ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3801 (1936).
39. Section 507(5), note 26 supra.
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cepted or paid.4" Subsection two, the most controversial, provides that
"An oral direction is effective for only one week after receipt by the
drawer of specific request for written direction, and any direction is
effective for only six months unless renewed in writing." Statutes
have been enacted in twenty-nine states with time limits ranging from
one year in two states to sixty days in two.4 The great majority have
selected six months, and this period has been adopted by the Code.
It has the virtue of being consistent with the stale check limitation, so
as to avoid an unduly large number of time limits in the Code. No
case need be made for some limitation on the effectiveness of stop
orders, when it is remembered that checks are presented to banks by
the thousands daily,4 2 and can come in over-the-counter at any number
of tellers' windows. How long must old stop orders be kept fresh in
the memory of the busy tellers? Six months is not harsh on the
drawer when the evidence we have indicates that over ninety per cent
of the checks written are presented within ten days after issue.43
The controversy rages around two points, first, the effectiveness
of the oral order, and second, the nature of the bank's obligation and
duties. Some of the statutes already mentioned require that the stop
order be in writing. The theory is that a written order should have an
equally dignified countermand. The trouble is that stop orders are
40. "Section 508. STOPPING PAYMENT.
"(1) The drawer may by direction to the drawee stop payment of any instrument
payable for the drawer's account until the drawee certifies or otherwise accepts the
instrument.
"(2) The direction must be received at such time and in such manner as to afford
a reasonable opportunity to act on it. An oral direction is effective for only one week
after receipt by the drawer of specific request for written direction, and any direction
is effective for only six months unless renewed in writing.
"(3) A drawee who by mistake pays an instrument notwithstanding an effective
stop order may recover a payment made to one who knew of the order.
"(4) Although the drawee cannot by contract avoid its obligations under this
Section it may make a reasonable charge for stopping payment."
41. One year: PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 7, § 819-912 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). Virginia
has the same limit.
Six months, e. g., ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 5, § 135(1) (1941). Same time limit in
Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin.
Ninety days, e. g., N. J. STAT. ANN., tit. 17:9-14 (1939). Same time limit in
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, Wyoming.
Sixty days, e. g., Iow-A CODE § 9266.1 (1939). Texas also has the same time limit.
The California Statute specifies no time limit.
42. The daily totals vary from over 1,100,000 items per day in some Federal Re-
serve Banks, about 350,000 in large metropolitan banks, to between 700 to 3,000 in the
small banks.
43. The Reporter for the Article has stated that a count made for him by one
large bank showed that 93 per cent of the checks were less than ten days old.
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usually telephoned to the bank.44 The depositor calls the officer having
supervision of his account, or some other employee in the bank with
whom he has had dealings, especially since he will want to be able
to identify himself. Or the call may be referred by the phone operator
to a teller charged with responsibility for handling stop orders. The
need for cultivating good public relations prevents bank personnel
from refusing to speak on the point at all, and any acceptance of the
phone call may be construed as a waiver of the right to insist on a
writing. 5 On the other hand, consider the position of the drawer.
He must act rapidly to get his direction to the bank in time to prevent
certification or payment, and a telegram, from the bank's point of view,
would not adequately identify the customer-anyone could have sent
it. On the phone the depositor could answer questions thus making his
identity certain. The fear of the bank is the false claim of an oral
stop order supported by oral testimony of a fabricated telephone con-
versation. Candor compels the admission that these fears are not
entirely groundless, but the banks feel that a claim of waiver of a
statutory requirement may be more difficult to establish than a claim
of an oral direction to stop. On the other hand even from the bank's
point of view, a claim of waiver would dispense with any need for a
writing, while a rule requiring confirmation in writing would permit
the bank to show its invariable practice of sending a form letter re-
questing confirmation in writing. A false claim of an oral stop order
would then have two hurdles to surmount, proof of the initial direction
and a slip-up in the bank's regular course of business. The drawer's
need for speed in stopping payment tips the scale in favor of the
validity of the oral direction.
The second issue is the extent of the bank's obligation. Many
banks today, in an effort to protect themselves against liability for
payment in disregard of an effective stop order, ask their customers to
sign forms containing stipulations releasing the bank from liability for
paying a check after timely receipt of a stop order.46  To the credit of
44. See Moore et al., Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop
Payment of Checks-Legal Method, 42 YAIx L. J. 817 (1933). The Washington stat-
ute is closest in pattern to the proposed Code, requiring written confirmation within
fifteen days. WAsH. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3252-1-3252-6 (Remington, 1932). A few
statutes require a writing, e. g., California, Iowa, Nebraska and Texas. Alabama, Con-
necticut and Georgia, for example, require only the renewals to be in writing.
45. E. g., Stanford State Bank v. Miles, 186 S. W. 2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
46. The cases are divided on the effectiveness of those clauses. Upholding the
clause: Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920) ; Gaita v.
Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929) ; Cohen v. State Bank of Phila-
delphia, 69 Pa. Super. 40 (1918). Clause against public policy: Grisinger v. Golden
State Bank of Long Beach, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268 Pac. 425 (1928) ; Speroff v. First
Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio 415, 79 N. E. 2d 119 (1948).
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the banks, it should be said that the clauses usually permit a charge
to the account only when the payment was by mistake or inadvertence,
though some clauses go as far as attempting to exculpate negligence.
Sometimes these clauses are printed in the so-called "deposit contract,"
or in fine print on the back of the "signature card" given the bank
when the account was opened. Pressure for these clauses is in part
the result of cases refusing the bank subrogation against the drawer
when a payment is made after due receipt of a stop order.4 7 In a most
recent case, the Ohio Supreme Court has given a rather unusual ruling.
That court in Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co.4" first, affirmed a rul-
ing that a clause in a written order to stop payment relieving a bank
from liability if it should pay the check "through inadvertency or over-
sight" was as a matter of public policy not enforceable against the
customer. Then, the court sent the case back for a new trial saying:
"However, in its amended answer the defendant, in addition
to pleading the purported release, alleges further that it at all
times exercised good faith and reasonable care with respect to
plaintiff's stop-payment order . . .' . . . This court is of the
opinion that . . . defendant does state a valid defense in alleging
that it exercised good faith and reasonable care. Hence for this
reason alone, the judgment sustaining the demurrer is reversed
and the cause is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for trial
on that issue."
This seems to place the bank's duty to stop payment, not on the
ground of a revocation of the order to pay and hence an absolute duty,
but treats the obligation rather as one of diligence and good faith.
The distinction between diligence and good faith which avoids lia-
bility and protection against payment by "inadvertency or oversight"
which cannot be obtained by contract seems difficult to draw but may
lie in a difference in the burden of coming forward with the evidence.
As to the validity of the exculpatory clause, the New York Court
of Appeals in Chase National Bank v. Battat,49 also decided in 1948,
held that a bank had no subrogation claim against its depositor in the
absence of ratification of the payment. The Court, however, stated
that
"We had occasion long since to indicate that a bank may
protect itself by contract with its depositor so as to limit liability
on a stop payment order. (Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y.
152, 155.) When that has not been done, the common-law lia-
bility is absolute in the absence of ratification . . ."
47. E. g., Chase Nat. Bank v. Battat, 297 N. Y. 185, 78 N. E. 2d 465 (1948) ; but
cf. Usher v. Tucker Co., 217 Mass. 441, 105 N. E. 360 (1914). See Note, 40 HARv.
L. REv. 110 (1926).
48. 149 Ohio 415, 79 N. E. 2d 119 (1948).
49. 297 N. Y. 185, 78 N. E. 2d 465 (1948).
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Thus, the New York court seems to prefer exculpatory clause technique
expressly rejected in Ohio. On the issue of the payor bank's right to
subrogation, the Battat case, decided on motion to dismiss, might be
distinguished later on the ground that there was no allegation in the
pleadings that the depositor was under an enforceable obligation to the
payee to pay the check, and also on the fact that the pleadings appear to
have been based upon a theory of recovery for unjust enrichment, rather
than upon a theory of subrogation. In any event the case seems
wrong in denying recovery with a dictum that a contract stipulation
would have permitted a charge to the account. Where a bank pays
in disregard of a stop payment order, better policy would seem to
require that it take its chances in an action, and be denied the
charge to the account. The burden of initiating'litigation should be on
the bank, not on the depositor to compel recredit to the account.
The Code solution is to outlaw any clause attempting to limit
liability, but to permit a double-barrelled subrogation to the rights of
the holder against the drawer or to the drawer's rights of recovery
or damages as if the drawer had made a payment."0 Thus, if we sup-
pose that the drawer bought a thousand cases of oranges, warranted
first quality, and then stopped payment on his check because two
hundred cases were bad, the bank paying the check should have a claim
against the drawer for the value of the eight hundred good cases
and against the payee for the two hundred bad cases. This right of
subrogation is given the bank whenever it makes a payment which
it may not charge to the drawer's account, as when it pays after notice
of the drawer's bankruptcy, after notice of the drawer's death, under
circumstances revoking its authority to pay, or after service of garnish-
ment or attachment with respect to the account.
Abrogation of the bank's right to limit its obligation to obey stop
orders by contract can also be justified on the ground that in practice
the large depositors, advised by counsel, refuse to sign the proffered
stipulation. As a practical matter, therefore, the stipulation binds only
the small customers. The author has received advice from several
bankers that they do not use the stipulation believing that insistence
upon it is bad public relations for their banks. It must be emphasized
that subrogation gives the bank no right to charge the account. If
amicable settlement is not possible, an action must be brought.
Section 507 (3) of the Code also provides that "A drawee who
by mistake or inadvertence pays an instrument notwithstanding an
effective stop order may recover a payment made to one who knew
of the order." This states the general rule and by implication rejects
50. Section 507(6), note 26 supra.
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the rule of some cases holding that recovery may be had where the
plaintiff bank sustains the burden of proving that the innocent recipient
has not prejudicially changed his position.5 The existence of the sub-
rogation remedy, of course, modifies the apparent rigidity of the rule
of finality of payment here adopted.
Section 508 (1) of the Code also adopts the prevalent rule that
a drawer may not compel a bank to withhold payment on a certified
check.5la
Death of Drawer. Does the death of the drawer of a check ter-
minate the drawee's authority to pay? Use of the term drawee's
authority to pay complicates the issue by conjuring up agency con-
cepts, under which death would revoke the authority of the bank to
act.52 But, as has been repeatedly held in New York, the rule must be
that only notice of death terminates the authority of the bank to pay
checks drawn on it.53 This rule the Code adopts, 4 but goes further
to provide that unless the bank is notified not to pay checks, it may,
notwithstanding notice, pay checks presented during the ten days fol-
lowing the date of death. Six states have statutes providing that a
bank may pay for a limited period after death, varying from a mini-
mum of ten days in Massachusetts and New Jersey to thirty days in
Florida, Maine, and Vermont." The purpose is to further the con-
51. E. g., Turetsky v. Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York, 22 N. Y. S.
2d 514 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 2d Dep't 1936). A recent Connecticut case adopts the
rule, but decides for the holder because the bank failed to prove that there had been
no change of position. Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Thompson, 134 Conn. 607,
59 A. 2d 727 (1948).
51a. See note 40 supra. The common law rule was unanimous when the holder
procured certificatioif. See, e. g., Times Square Auto Co. v. Rutherford National
Bank, 77 N. J. L. 649, 73 Atl. 479 (1909) ; Steiner v. Germantown Trust Co., 104
Pa. Super. 38, 148 Atl. 180 (1932). There is some conflict where the drawer pro-
cures certification. Compare Florida Power & Light Co. v. Tomasello, 103 Fla. 1076,
139 So. 140 (1932) (no power to stop) and Fiss Corp. v. National Safety Bank &
Trust Co., 191 Misc. 397, 77 N. Y. Supp. 2d 293 (City Ct. N. Y. 1948) (statute not
cited) with Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 644, 126 Atl. 435 (1924) (dic-
tum that drawer having a good defense can stop). Both New Jersey and New York
now have statutory provisions that a bank shall not be required to stop a certified
check. See, e. g., N. Y. NEG T ABLa INSTRUMENTS LAW § 325-a (1045). The statute is
silent on the liability of a bank if it is notified that an indorsement has been forged on
a certified check. This is notice that the person in possession is not a holder.
52. See, e. g., Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 61 P. 2d 589 (1936) (Bank having
agency powers with respect to customer's bonds).
53. E. g., Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N. Y. 12, 102 N. E.
537 (1913).
54. "Section 509. DuxrH oF DRAWER oF CHECK.
"The death of the drawer does not revoke the authority of a bank to pay checks
"(a) for ten days after the date of death unless the bank is notified that checks
are not to be paid; or
"(b) thereafter until the bank has knowledge of the death."
55. E. g., MAss. LAWS ANN., c. 107, § 17 (1947). Virginia has a two weeks
limit. In addition to the states enumerated, there is a statute in Connecticut applying
to savings account withdrawal orders only. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3988 (1930). Con-
necticut, Maine, Massachusetts and New Jersey have time limits running from the
date of the instrument with authority to pay given if death supervenes. The time
limits in Vermont, Virginia, and the Code run from the date of death, and thus allow
payment of "stale" checks after knowledge of death.
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cept of the check as an instrument of immediate payment and save the
holders the necessity of proving a claim in probate. Experience shows
that the great majority of these checks are for debts that ultimately
are paid and elimination of these useless claims in probate will simplify
administration. Of course nothing in the statute prevents the execu-
tor from recovering any improper payment from the holder as was done
in Burrows v. Burrows.5" Further protection to an estate is given by
terminating this authority upon receipt by the bank of a notice not to
pay without regard to the source of the notice. The statutory period
is too short to permit notice from the executor, as he usually is not
appointed in time and it seems desirable that the bank should not be
required to determine whether the party giving notice has a legitimate
interest. The fact that he gives the notice in the ten day period after
death is sufficiently indicative of his interest.
Wrongful Dishonor. Another provision not found in the N. I. L.
regulates the liability of the drawee for wrongful dishonor of a bill.
Section 510 17 provides that liability for wrongful dishonor is limited
to the actual damages proved including any arrest or prosecution of
the drawer. The section is worded to cover the case whether the
jurisdiction proceeds upon a breach of contract theory or a theory of
defamation. Rejecting the common law rule that damage can be
"conclusively presumed" without proof where the drawer is a
"trader," 58 the section adopts for all drawers the non-trader rule that
damages must be proved, but settles one split of authority in favor of
liability. Bad check laws are now so common that no result of a
wrongful dishonor is more foreseeable than arrest and prosecution of
the drawer. Twenty-three states have adopted a statute sponsored
by the American Bankers Association requiring actual proof of dam-
ages,"9 but these statutes are silent on the issue of liability for arrest
or prosecution.
FORMAL REQUISITES
Under the N. I. L. there has been considerable litigation over the
essential requisites of negotiability and several divergent lines of au-
56. 240 Mass. 485, 134 N. E. 271 (1922).
57. "Section 510. LIABILITY or DRAWEE FOR DISHONOR.
"Where a drawee wrongfully dishonors a bill through mistake or inadvertence the
drawer's recovery for defamation or loss of credit is limited to the actual damages
proved, including any arrest or prosecution of the drawer."
58. E. g., Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 Pac. 462 (1922).
59. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 7, § 211 (Purdon, 1939). Similar statutes have
been adopted in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, Wyoming.
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thority have developed. The Code by express provision covers certain
of the major divisions, consistently ruling in favor of negotiability.
Seals
Section 112 settles a conflict under the N. I. L. by specifically
providing that, "An instrument otherwise negotiable is within this
Article even though it be a sealed instrument." This clearly allows
the maker to prove want of consideration as against one not a holder
in due course.60
Conditional Promises
The definition of an unconditional promise is enlarged." On the
issue of whether a promise or order is conditional because in effect
"an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund," 62 the Code
approves negotiability where the instrument is limited to pay out of
the entire assets of the issuing partnership, unincorporated association,
trust, or estate." Negotiability is also conferred on governmentals
that are limited in payment to the proceeds of a particular source or
60. N. I. L. § 6(4) providing that "the validity and negotiable character of an
instrument are not affected by the fact that" it "(4) Bears a seal" was not strong
enough language to subject sealed notes to all the incidents of the Act, especially in the
matter of the defense of lack of consideration. Compare Balliet v. Fetter, 314 Pa. 284,
171 At. 466 (1934) (seal precludes defense of lack of consideration), with Italo-
Petroleum Corp. v. Hanigan, 40 Del. 534, 14 A. 2d 401 (1940) (defense available).
But if a rebuttable presumption promotes circulation of notes, why not a conclusive
one where a seal is used? See 26 MICH. L. REv. 208 (1927). Of course, the business
man's hostility to the effect of the seal between the immediate parties accounts for the
majority rule.
61. "Section 104. WHEN PROMISE OR ORDER UNCONDITIONAL.
"(1) A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made conditional by the
fact that the instrument
"(a) is subject to conditions not expressly stated therein; or
"(b) states its consideration, whether performed or promised, or the transaction
which gave rise to the instrument, or that the promise or order is made or
the instrument matures in accordance with or 'as per' such transaction; or
"(c) refers to a separate agreement or indicates that it arises out of such agree-
ment; or
"(d) indicates that it is secured, whether by mortgage, reservation of title or
otherwise; or
"(e) indicates a particular account to be debited or any other fund or source
from which reimbursement is expected; or
"(f) is limited to payment out of a particular fund or the proceeds of a particular
source, if the instrument is issued by a government or governmental agency
or unit; or
"(g) is limited to payment out of the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated
association, trust or estate by or on behalf of which the instrument is issued.
"(2) A promise or order is not unconditional if the instrument
"(a) states that it is subject to or governed by any other agreement; or
"(b) states that it is to be paid only out of a particular fund or source except as
provided in this Section; or
"(c) otherwise expressly states any condition to its payment."
62. N. I. L. §3.
63. Some cases were able to reach this result. E. g., Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y.
167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907); Nelson Co. v. Morton, 106 Cal. App. 144, 288 Pac. 845
(1930).
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fund. If a theory were to be devised for these additions, it could be
said that here the Code recognizes additional commercial entities.
This would be proper on the issue of negotiability because the entities
so recognized are of the type that are subject to separate credit evalua-
tion in the market, and prospective purchasers are normally in the
business of making credit evaluations.
Under the N. I. L. some difficulty has also been experienced over
the tendency of the courts to impart a conditional quality to the instru-
ment by construction of language. That the instrument is to serve
as an accounting voucher as well as an instrument for the payment of
money was recognized by the N. I. L. in provisions permitting, first,
an indication of a particular account to be debited, second, a particular
fund out of which reimbursement is to be made, and third, a statement
of the transaction giving rise to the instrument; 64 but these three
permissions, however, are the only indication given in that law of the
proper interpretation of the word "unconditional". Since, in strict
form at least, the three exceptions could not be construed as in any way
making the promise conditional, the express statutory statement that
they were not to have that effect could have been taken as an indica-
tion that a strict construction of "conditional" was desired. Com-
mercial practice, however, appears to have tended in a contrary direc-
tion, and consequently under the N. I. L. the cases were divided on
whether a recital that the instrument was given in return for an
executory promise was an implied condition limiting the obligation to
pay should the promise be not performed,'5 or a mere statement of
the transaction giving rise to the instrument.66 The Code adopts the
statement of the transaction view by expressly providing in Section
104 (1) (a) that the promise or order "is not made conditional by
the fact that the instrument (a) is subject to conditions not expressly
stated therein . . ." Literally read this leads to what at first appears
to be strange results. Apparently the instrument is admittedly subject
to the conditions, and so cannot be enforced free of them. As between
the immediate parties this should be the result. The real question is,
and should be, whether the holder in due course will take free of the
condition. Section 307 (5) (b) provides that knowledge of the fact
64. N. I. L. § 3.
65. E. g., Ivory v. Lamoreaux, 241 Mich. 226, 217 N. W. 54 (1928) ; National
Bank in Salem v. Morgan, 132 Ore. 515, 284 Pac. 582, 286 Pac. 558 (1930).
66. E. g., Mountjoy Parts Co. v. San Antonio Nat. Bank, 12 S. W. 2d 609 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928); First Bank of Marianna v. Havanna Canning Co., 142 Fla. 554, 195
So. 188 (1940); cf. Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Chicago Trust & Savings Bank, 131 Ill.
569, 23 N. E. 417 (1890), decided before N. I. L. The apparent diversity can be nar-
rowed by technical distinctions turning on the use of language, but in view of the
speed of commercial transactions rules should be drawn which render this sort of inter-
pretation unnecessary wherever possible.
LAW OF COMMERCIAL PAPER
that an instrument was issued for an executory promise "is not of
itself notice" to a purchaser of an infirmity or defect "unless the pur-
chaser has notice of any defense or claim arising from the terms
thereof." Section 308 frees the holder in due course from "all claims"
to the instrument "on the part of any person" and from "all defenses
of any party except" certain real defenses not material here. The ap-
parent intent is that the holder in due course takes free of any defense
of nonperformance of the conditions, and this conclusion is buttressed
by the preamble to Section 104 (1) (a) that the pronise or order
is not conditional.
The differences that have arisen over the interpretation of the
words "as per" in an instrument, as well as the division of authority
under the so-called "full Federal Reserve clause" in a trade acceptance,
namely that "The obligation of the acceptor hereof arises out of the
purchase of goods from the drawer, maturity being in conformity with
the original terms of purchase" are also expressly covered in the Code.
Section 104 (1) (b) provides that "A promise or order otherwise
unconditional is not made conditional by the fact that the instrument
* . . (b) states . . . that the promise or order is made or that the
instrument matures in accordance with or 'as per' such transaction."
This accepts the ruling in cases such as State Trading Corporation v.
Jordan"8 that the full Federal Reserve clause does not destroy nego-
tiability. But the rule as stated will not, and cannot cover all possible
situations involving the use of the words "as per." For example, the
proposed provision would not necessarily have changed the results of
the three cases arising out of the Reolo frauds. Trade acceptances
covering drug shipments were obtained from the purchasers, whose
contracts did not oblige them to pay for the goods unless they proved
readily saleable. Three purchasers, in signing their acceptances,
signed language reading as follows: "Accepted for payment as per
67. There is, however, a difficulty that should be clarified. N. I. L. 57 provided
that the holder in due course took free of defect of title and defenses, and by denom-
inating nonperformance of the payee's executory promise a defect, the holder in due
course could take free. The danger in the present language is that there is an impli-
cation from Code § 104(1) (a) that the instrument is subject to a condition, and Sec-
tion 308 on the rights of a holder in due course only frees him from "claims" and "de-
fenses." Thus, as under the N. I. L., the language may not be strong enough to require
a court to change its prior rulings. The condition could be denominated a condition
precedent, and thus the burden of pleading and proving performance could be placed
on all holders, as nonperformance would thus neither be a "claim" nor a defense. Nor
will the language in Code § 309(b) that lack or failure of consideration is a defense
as in an action on a simple contract help, for the rule that performance of conditions
precedent must be proved by plaintiff is a rule of the law of simple contracts.
68. 146 Pa. Super. 166, 22 A. 2d 30 (1941). Accord: State Trading Corp. v.
Rosen, 126 Conn. 37, 9 A. 2d 289 (1939); States Trading Corp. v. Toepfert, 304
Mass. 473, 23 N. E. 2d 1008 (1939) ; contra: First Nat. Bank, Statesville v. Power
Equipment Co., 211 Iowa 153, 233 N. W. 103 (1930).
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Reolo contract for amount and date shown hereon." In the only one of
the three cases in which the author has seen the record, the words "as
per Reolo contract" were handwritten above a carat inserted after
the word "payment," and the inference is that the phrase was so in-
serted in the other cases, since the form was printed. The Federal Dis-
trict Court in Minnesota held the acceptance to be unconditional, and
that the International Finance Company took free of the defense of
nonperformance.69 The Maryland court ruled that the important fac-
tor was the position of the words "as per." Since the words modified
the obligation to pay, defenses were let in, because the acceptance was
thus made conditional. 7' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with both
prior decisions before it, relied upon a presumption favoring nego-
tiability and accordingly ruled that the acceptance was unconditional. 71
Under the proposed Code it will still be possible for the Maryland
court to rule that a distinction exists between a promise or order
"made . . . 'as per' " a given contract, and a promise "to pay as per
contract." The point to be made is that the Code cannot create a
millennium. Problems of interpretation of language will forever re-
main. The specific reference to the words "as per" in the Code should
make all well-advised draftsmen avoid any use of the words except
in almost statutory language, but courts must still attempt to work out
justice between individuals who have written their documents without
benefit of counsel. The frame of reference can now more clearly be
whether the "as per" was chosen to modify the obligation to pay or was
merely a statement of how the promise came to be made in the first
place, with aid given any court desiring to favor negotiability.
The Sum Certain
Aside from problems of acceleration which require separate dis-
cussion elsewhere and problems of costs of collection and attorney's
fees, litigation involving the "sum certain" 72 has centered around two
69. International Finance Co. v. Northwestern Drug Co., 282 Fed. 920 (D. Minn.
1922).
70. International Finance Corp. v. Calvert Drug Co., 144 Md. 303, 124 At. 891
(1924).
71. International Finance Corp. v. Philadelphia Wholesale Drug Co., 312 Pa. 280,
167 Atl. 790 (1933).
72. Code § 105. SuM CERTAIN
"(1) The sum payable is a sum certain although it is to be paid
"(a) with interest or by stated installments; or
"(b) with different rates of interest before and after default or a specified
date; or
"(c) with a stated discount or addition if paid before or after the date fixed
for payment; or
"(d) with exchange or less exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at the cur-
rent rate; or
"(e) with costs of collection or an attorney's fee or both upon default.
"(2) Nothing in this Section shall validate any term which is otherwise
illegal."
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principal areas, the discount note and the different rate of interest
before and after maturity.
Varying Rate of Interest: The varying rate of interest note has
caused more than a little trouble. For example, in First National Bank
of Miami v. Bosler, a suit by an indorsee against the maker, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had before it a promissory note which
contained the following interest provisions, ". . . with interest thereon
at the rate of eight per cent per annum from date until fully paid.
Interest payable semi-annually . . . Deferred payments are to bear in-
terest from maturity at ten per cent per annum semi-annually." The
court held that the note was non-negotiable because it apparently
provided for two interest rates after maturity. Since a holder could
not tell which would control, the sum was thereby rendered uncertain.
The New York Appellate Division was not impressed by this reasoning
and refused to hold an identical note non-negotiable.74 The New
York Court did find, however, that the plaintiff was not a holder in due
course. That both notes were obtained from unwary makers during
the Florida land boom sales may account for the similarity in result,
namely no recovery. Although Professor Chafee has suggested a prin-
ciple that the meaning of a negotiable note should be clear from the
face of the instrument and when it is not, the instrument should not
be negotiable,75 it is not at all clear to the author why a maker's
defenses should be let in against a holder in due course merely
because counsel is able to conjure up an ambiguity. Even where some
incidental ambiguity actually exists, as to the rate of interest and like
matters, denying holder in due course status to this purchaser of an
otherwise negotiable note seems incongruous. There is no indication
of anything wrong in the original transaction, and no indication that
an ambulatory instrument was not intended by the parties.
There is much justification for the majority rule on varying in-
terest rates, that so long as the amount due at the date of maturity is
ascertainable, other provisions in aid of collection, if not unlawful,
should not destroy negotiability. A lender might well be willing to
make a short term loan at a low rate of interest, and if the loan were
not repaid, be willing to settle for a rate of interest higher than the
original rate but lower than the legal rate, for whatever period might
be required to collect. Since a note with interest at three per cent until
the date fixed for payment, in many states will draw interest at the
73. 297 Pa. 353, 147 Aft. 74 (1929).
74. Lessen v. Lindsey, 238 App. Div. 262, 264 N. Y. Supp. 391 (4th Dep't 1933).
75. BRANNAw, NEGOTMBLE INSTRUMENTS LAW AXx. 30 (4th ed., Chafee, 1926).
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legal rate after the due date,76 no sound reason appears why a stipula-
tion for a lesser rate should destroy negotiability. The Code would
even let the parties change rates of interest prior to maturity, for its
provision on the "sum certain" includes a note "with different rates
of interest before and after default or a specified date." 77 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Indeed, an argument could be made that all stipulations for inter-
est are incidental and should not affect negotiability. It is well known
that the price of a note is affected by the rate of interest. If the rate
of interest specified in the note is higher than the current rate, other
things being equal, the note will command a premium when sold
sufficient to make the note yield the current rate to the purchaser. If
the rate specified on the note is below the current rate, the price will be
at a discount so as to bring the yield up to the current rate. What
then of a note calling for interest in the words "at the current rate ?"
The author is informed that such notes are now being written in the
money market. Under the above reasoning, it is argued that the note
would always be transferable at face value, and the sum payable would
be known at the due date as the face amount of the note would be
multiplied by interest at the current rate to determine the total amount
to be paid. Nothing in the N. I. L. or in the Code bears specifically
on this problem. The N. I. L. provides that a sum is certain al-
though it is to be paid "with interest," and no mention of rate is
made.7" The Code in Section 105 (1) (a) says "with interest
or by stated installments" and subsection (b) provides for the different
rates of interest mentioned above. Both N. I. L. and Code specifically
confer negotiability on instruments payable "with exchange whether at
a fixed rate or at the current rate." 7 (Emphasis supplied.) Of
course, this provision can cut both ways, the specific reference to one
"current rate" could by implication exclude other current rates. Or,
it could be argued that since the uncertainty engendered by one cur-
rent rate is not thought to destroy negotiability, the minor differences
involved in fluctuations of interest rates should have the same effect.
There is, however, one obvious difference in the two situations. On
the due date, the rate of exchange from one currency to another is
known, but is the "current rate of interest" sufficiently definite and
known? Are there not variations between mortgage loans, term loans
76. E. g., Pryor v. Buffalo, 197 N. Y. 123, 90 N. E. 423 (1909).
77. See note 72 supra.
78. N. I. L. §2(1).
79. N. I. L. §2(4) ; Code § 105(1) (d). The Code adds after "with exchange" the
words "or less exchange."
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to industry and even between industries? It would seem so, yet these
facts are known to those dealing in the money market.
In the note with interest "at the current rate" a problem of inter-
pretation arises. As of what time is the current rate to be taken,
the time of making or the date of payment? Or should the interest
be calculated periodically as the current rate changes during the life
of the note? That is to say, should the note be deemed to bear interest
at, say 1%,4% for the first six months, that being the current rate at
that time, then at 1 2 7 for the next year and the final period at 14% ?
Had the parties meant the rate in existence when the note was
made they could easily have expressed the rate. Why then state "at
the current rate"? Apparently the borrower wants the protection of a
time loan and the lender does not want a long term commitment at
present low rates with the indication of increased rates in the near
future. Of course, if we adopt the rule that any ambiguity results in
non-negotiability, then such notes could be found ambiguous and ruled
non-negotiable. On the other hand, the ambiguity of interpretation
could be resolved by ruling that on demand notes, interest should be
calculated at the "call money" rates in effect from time to time. Time
notes, with interest payable in instalments could be held payable at
the rate prevailing when the instalment is due. This is merely a note
with an increase or decrease in interest at specified dates and so would
be negotiable on that ground. Selecting the due date when interest is
payable periodically, does not lead to the conclusion that when such
is not the case in a time note, the intention is to calculate all interest
at the rate in effect when the note is due. Suppose the rate went down
instead of up? Would not the fairest result be to calculate interest
at the several rates in effect during the life of the note giving neither
borrower nor lender an advantage? On such an interpretation what
we have is merely a note providing for varying interest rates.
In short, such notes will not be issued, or circulate at such
speculative discounts as to bar them from the mercantile currency of
the country. Yet the lack of any definite measure of "interest at the
current rate" will lead to squabbles over whether a tender was sufficient
and so whether indorsers were discharged. Under the rule of the
Bosler case, then, such notes would be non-negotiable, but a note call-
ing for interest at the current Federal Reserve re-discount rate, or
"the current call money rate plus 3 per cent" on the above analysis
should be negotiable.
Discount Note: The discount note has also caused trouble.
Typically, it is a promise to pay a definite sum on a given due date
with a discount allowed if payment is made within, for example, thirty
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days."0 A similar problem arises with the note payable in instalments,
but providing for "late charges" if payments are not made on the due
date.8 ' A third situation involves the premium to be paid if the maker
desires to anticipate any payments. The "late charge" type of note can
be classed with other charges after maturity and come under the prin-
ciple, if such there be, that provisions relating to what happens after
maturity or default do not destroy negotiability. These clauses do not
come into operation during the circulation of the instrument, and all
are designed to ensure actual realization by the holder of the face of
the instrument without losses caused by the expense of collecting.
The premium and discount notes are more difficult to justify on
such theoretical grounds because these provisions can interfere with
the calculation of the present worth of the instrument. Fundamental
to any such calculation is the assumption that the note will be paid at
maturity. But how is the present worth to be calculated where the
instrument reads, "Two years after date I promise to pay to the order
of the Last Stove Mfg. Co. the sum of one thousand dollars with a
discount of thirty per cent if paid in ninety days"? Technically under
the proposed Code such a note is negotiable, as the sum is to be paid
"with a stated discount or addition if paid before or after the date fixed
for payment." 82 But what would a purchaser pay for it? The answer
is that during the first ninety days we have a note for seven hundred
dollars and after that date a thousand dollar note. Most makers can
be relied upon not to sign notes involving such unusual discounts, and
our usury laws and the rules against penalties and forfeitures will
protect the few who might, the Code expressly providing that nothing
in the sum certain section shall validate any term otherwise illegal. 8
The cases have normally involved a usual trade discount, and no good
80. Negotiable: Loring v. Anderson, 95 Minn. 101, 103 N. W. 722 (1905) ; Farm-
ers Loan & Trust Co. v. Planck, 98 Neb. 225, 152 N. W. 390 (1915) ; Harrison v.
Hunter, 168 S. W. 1036 (.Tex. Civ. App. 1914) ; First Nat. Bank of Iowa City v.
Rooney, [1913] 11 D. L. R. 358 (Sask. Sup. Ct.).
Non-negotiable: Waterhouse v. Chouinard, 128 Me. 505, 149 Atl. 21 (1930) ; Farm-
ers Loan & Trust Co. v. McCoy & Spivey Bros., 32 Okla. 277, 122 Pac. 125 (1912);
Nat. Bank v. Feeney, 12 S. D. 156, 80 N. W. 186 (1899).
The Pennsylvania rule cannot be premised with certainty. In Stevens v. Baldy,
67 Pa. Super. 145 (1917) the Common Pleas court ruled a discount note to be nego-
tiable, but the Superior Court in reversing on other grounds expressly left open the
issue of negotiability, and the Supreme Court in First Nat. Bank of Miami v. Bosler,
297 Pa. 353, 357, 147 Atl. 74, 76 (1929), by citing with approval an early Michigan
case, holding a discount note non-negotiable, may have given some indication of its
attitude.
81. Interstate Contracting, Co. v. Mager (No. 1), 51 D. & C. 113 (Pa. C. P.,
Pike County 1943). This case involved F. H. A. additional charges for processing
late payments on an instalment note. These charges can, of course, be distinguished
from the discount or addition situation as they only apply after maker has made a
default. The court held the note negotiable.
82. Code § 105(1)(c), supra note 72.
83. Code § 105 (2).
LAW OF COMMERCIAL PAPER
reason appears why a note expressing normal and usual trade terms
should not be negotiable, or why the seller who wants to discount his
sales should be compelled to go back to the buyer and obtain a note
every time the buyer fails to take advantage of his allowances for
prompt payment.
The clarifications proposed for the "time certain" provisions
are reserved for subsequent discussion with the problem of acceleration.
PROBLEMS OF INDORSEMENT
Whether an instrument was payable to bearer, and so could be
negotiated by delivery alone, or whether it was payable to order, and
required an effective indorsement has raised several difficult ques-
tions under the N. I. L. The problem of the "fictitious payee" is so
related to the forgery problem that both should be discussed together
elsewhere.
Instruments Payable to an Estate
The human tendency to personify aggregates of assets has led
to trouble in the field of decedent's estates where several cases involv-
ing notes payable to "The estate of" a named decedent have come be-
fore the courts with conflicting results under N. I. L., Section 9. In
Bacher v. City National Bank of Philadelphia 8 ' such an instrument
was ruled by the Pennsylvania Court not to be payable to bearer as it
was but a short form for designating the executor for the time being of
the estate. In Hansen v. Northwestern National Bank,85 the Minne-
sota Court had previously taken the opposite view. On strictly con-
ceptual reasoning it is easy to agree with Ames that it is "a perversion
of language to call the payee in such a note a fictitious or non-existing
person," 86 and earlier cases were in accord.8 T In the actual cases,
however, the real issue was, who should bear the loss caused by the
wrongdoing of the attorney of the estate. In both of these cases the
instrument came into possession of the attorney for the estate, who
84. 347 Pa. 80, 31 A. 2d 725 (1943) ; see also Strong v. City Nat. Bank of Phila-
delphia, 355 Pa. 390, 50 A. 2d 323 (1947). The actual decision in this case was for
the defendant, but on the proper issue, namely, whether the bank accepting the check
for deposit to the attorney's personal account, where the lawyer had a power of attor-
ney, had actual notice of a breach of trust under Section 9 of the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 3393 (Purdon, 1923).
85. 175 Minn. 453, 221 N. W. 873 (1928). After the decision, Minnesota
amended N. I. L. § 8, by adding "An instrument payable to the estate of a deceased
person shall be deemed payable to the order of the administrator or executor of his
estate." MINN. LAWs 1929. c. 353. This was not sufficient to compel the court to
rule that a note payable to the estate of a named incompetent was order paper.
Kluczny v. Matz, 187 Minn. 93, 244 N. W. 407 (1932). The Code § 109(1) (e) com-
pels an opposite result. See text infra.
86. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, A Word More, 14 HARV. L. Rxv.
442, 443, n. 3 (1900).
87. E. g., Peltier v. Babillion, 45 Mich. 384, 8 N. W. 99 (1881).
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indorsed the instrument and then negotiated the instrument in pay-
ment of his personal debt. The real issue then was whether the court
should make the estate, or the purchaser, suffer for the wrongdoing
of the attorney for the estate and be left with a claim against the
embezzling attorney. Even under this analysis, however, the Penn-
sylvania ruling seems preferable on the issue whether the paper was
payable to order or to bearer."s Mere entrusting of paper payable to
the order of an estate to the attorney for the estate should not con-
stitute a sufficient reason to place liability on the estate. In neither
case did the purchaser rely on the subsequently urged bearer character
of the instrument in making his purchase, for there was a regular chain
of indorsements. The usual rule relating to holding under unauthor-
ized negotiation should apply, and the Code will require its application,
because Section 109 (1) (e) makes an instrument payable to "an
estate, trust, fund, partnership or unincorporated association...
payable to the order of any person authorized to hold in that behalf."
Thus under the Code, an instrument payable to the "Community
Chest," or the like would also be order paper requiring a proper
indorsement.
Conversion from Bearer to Order Paper
Another problem which has only been before the courts in three
cases, but which has vexed writers and students since the N. I. L. was
adopted, is the problem of the conversion of bearer to order paper by
indorsement. It is clear that paper which was originally order paper
can be converted to bearer paper by indorsement in blank."9 Can it
thereafter be controlled by a subsequent special indorsement? The
N. I. L. is not as clear on this point as it might be. The problem re-
quires that Sections 9 (5), 34 and 40 of the N. I. L." be interpreted and
brought into harmony if possible. One suggested interpretation is that
a subsequent special indorsement will control where paper was orig-
inally payable to order, but the bearer quality will continue where the
instrument was bearer paper on its face."° This solution is based upon
88. See note 84 supra.
89. N. I. L. § 34, "An instrument so indorsed [in blank] . . . is payable to
bearer, . . ..
90. Under N. I. L. 9(5) an instrument is payable to bearer "when the only or last
indorsement is an indorsement in blank" and by negative pregnant when neither "only"
nor "last" is in blank it is not payable to bearer. N. I. L. § 34, in addition to the part
quoted, supra note 89, provides that where an instrument is specially indorsed "the
indorsement of such indorsee is necessary to the further negotiation of the instrument."
Then N. I. L. § 40 provides "Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed
specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery; but the person indors-
ing specially is liable as indorser only to such holders as make title through his indorse-
ment." See BRANNMA, NEGOTrA LE INSTR U :NTS LAW 628-631 (7th ed., Beutel,
1948). Sections 48 and 88 should also be considered.
90a. See McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 50 Amd. L. REG. 437, 454-
462 (1902).
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the theory that the maker of bearer paper contracts for the right to pay
any person in possession, and should not be liable to a "true owner"
when he pays on a forged indorsement. The three cases raising the
point ruled that order paper indorsed in blank continues to be bearer
paper, but the cases can perhaps be explained on their facts.91 In any
event, the Code adopts the view that the special indorsement controls
both order paper blank indorsed and paper originally drawn payable
to bearer. Section 204 (1) provides "An instrument payable to order
and indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated
by delivery alone until specially indorsed." Section 204 (2) states
that "'Any instrument specially indorsed may be further negotiated
only by the indorsement of the special indorser." These are the only
sections bearing on the problem. With the removal of investment
securities from the scope of Article III, the argument in favor of maker
protection loses much of its validity, as the corporate bond issue with
thousands of holders is no longer involved. The interest of holders
in protection against loss or theft is apparently thought to outweigh
the protection of payment by makers or drawees.
Restrictive Indorsements
The N. I. L. defines as restrictive an indorsement which prohibits
further negotiation, constitutes the indorsee the agent of the indorser,
or vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some
other person.' Despite the fact that several widely diverse factual
situations are presented, Sections 37 and 47 of the N. I. L. apparently
attach identical consequences to them all. 3 The law is further com-
91. Parker v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 174, 137 N. E. 295 (1922) ; Christian v. Califor-
nia Bank, 30 Cal. 2d 421, 182 P. 2d 554 (1947) ; In re Schmitt's Estate, 288 IU. App.
250, 6 N. E. 2d 444 (1937). The Massachusetts and Illinois cases involved instru-
ments that were returned to parties prior to the special indorsee without cancellation
of the special indorsement and transferred by such prior parties. Defendant's claim
that plaintiff had not proved himself a holder was purely technical and received the
treatment it deserved. The California case involved an instrument indorsed in blank
by an individual and then specially indorsed in the name of a partnership by the same
individual and delivered to his partner for deposit in partnership account. Contrary
to authority the second partner struck the partnership indorsement and deposited in
his personal account in his depositary bank. The holding protected the paying bank,
putting the risk of the partner's wrongdoing on the partnership, because "ostensibly
one partner has as much right as another to strike a partnership indorsement." The de-
positary bank, however, was required to stand trial on the ground that it saw the sec-
ond partner strike out the partnership indorsement and consequently was on notice of
possible limitations on his authority to use the check.
92. N. I. L. § 36. The following analysis is based almost entirely on Chafee,
Remarks on Restrictive Indorsements, 58 HAnv. L. REv. 1182 (1945) ; STEFFEN, CASES
ON COMxEsMAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER (1939) passim; BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw or BILLS ANm NoTEs 255-86 (1943) ; and, of course, upon the Notes and Com-
ments of the Reporter for the Code.
93. N. I. L. § 37 does recognize a distinction between an indorsement prohibiting
further transfer and the other types in subsection (3) allowing the restrictive indorsee
to transfer his rights where the form of the indorsement allows him to do so.
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plicated by the fact that the Bank Collection Code has seized upon the
concept of restrictive indorsement for the "for deposit", "for collection"
and "pay any bank, banker or trust company" type of indorsement; "
nor can we consider certain of the problems in this field without refer-
ence to the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.95
On analysis, several factually and functionally different situations
are covered by the present idea, "restrictive indorsement :" (1) in-
dorsement prohibiting further transfer; (2) indorsement to an agent
of the indorser; (3) indorsement to an agent for a third party; (4)
indorsement to a trustee for the indorser; (5) indorsement to a trustee
for a third party; and, (6) indorsement for bank collection. Yet these
six possible situations can be fitted into three larger categories, the
indorsement prohibiting further negotiation, the indorsement to an
agent or trustee, and the indorsement for bank collection. At first
sight, it may seem unsound to treat the agent and trustee under one
heading, but the legal problem, so far as the negotiable instruments
law is concerned, is essentially the same." The problem of bank col-
lections is, in reality, neither an agency nor a trust problem. It is
unique and should receive separate treatment. Under the Code each
category is separately treated, and the term "restrictive indorsement"
is not used.
The Agency or Trust Indorsement: One category of restrictive
indorsement is the indorsement to an agent or to a trustee as such.
Let us consider the trust indorsement first, supposing a note indorsed
by the payee "to A in trust for B." Quite apart from the N. I. L. we
should, on principles of trust law understand that A, when he pur-
chased the note with trust funds, took a legal title subject to the
equitable interest of B the cestui que trust,97 and that as against
prior parties A would have all the rights, privileges and immunities
of a bona fide purchaser for value if he qualified as one. Equally,
when A sells the note, again apart from the N. I. L., the purchaser
would know that he was dealing with a trustee for B, because the
indorsement to A says so. The purchaser, "then will not take free
of B's equities unless the sale is a proper exercise of the trustee's
94. BANK COLLECTION CODE § 4. The statute at present is in force in eighteen
jurisdictions, including New York and Pennsylvania. 2 PATON, DIGEST 1378 (1942).
95. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, §§ 3111-3414 (Purdon, 1930). It is also in force
in 19 other jurisdictions. 9 U. L. A. Supp. 104 (1947).
96. The issue is really what effect should be given to the fact that the indorsee
holds in a fiduciary capacity for another. The definition of a "fiduciary" in the Uni-
form Fiduciaries Act § 1 includes trustee, agent, partner, corporate officer, executor,
etc.
97. 1 Scorr, TRusTs § 2.3 (1939).
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trust powers, or of his apparent powers." Indeed since a negotiable
instrument is an ambulatory instrument, it might be argued that the
trustee had an apparent authority to sell which would confer holder in
due course status upon a purchaser in the absence of notice from other
facts of a limitation on the trustee's powers. One of these, of course,
would be where the trustee attempts to use such an instrument to pay
a personal debt.9
But under the N. I. L., Section 37 apparently limits the trustee to
bringing any action his indorser could bring, and Section 47 supplies
the coup de grace by terminating negotiability when an instrument has
been restrictively indorsed. Thus, the trustee is apparently denied an
independent holder in due course status, and the postamble of Section
37 gives a purchaser from a trustee only the title that the trustee had.' 0
In apparent disregard of these provisions, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act
provides that in the case of an instrument indorsed to a fiduciary as
such, a purchaser taking by indorsement from the fiduciary
is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a
breach of his obligation as fiduciary in indorsing or delivering
the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary
is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary unless he
takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or
with knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instru-
ment amounts to bad faith.1 1
The apparent intent is to confer a good title and a holder in due course
status upon the indorsee unless his actual knowledge or bad faith pre-
clude it. Yet even though the indorsee from the fiduciary is "not bound
98. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 288 (1939).
99. 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 297.6 (1939). See UmFORm FIDucIARIEs Ac §§ 4, 6, 8, 9.
Cf. Lloyd v. Sigourney, 5 Bing. 525, 130 Eng. Rep. 1164 (Ex. Ch. 1829) ("Pay to
Samuel Williams . . . for my use"). The statute requires actual notice of such
use. Cf. the holding against the cashing bank in Christian v. California Bank, 30
Cal. 2d 421, 182 P. 2d 554 (1947).
100. Cf. Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93 (1919).
Compare Union Trust Co. v. Matthews, 258 Mich. 433, 242 N. W. 781 (1931) (parol
evidence showed indorsee to be trustee in fact; indorsement therefore restrictive and
trustee not holder in due course). But cf. the common law cases treating the indorse-
ment "To A in trust for B" as a special indorsement except that notice of the specific
equity of the beneficiary is given. Chafee, supra note 92, at 1202-03. And compare
Coral Gables, Inc. v. Jones, 323 Pa. 425, 187 At. 434 (1936) (indorsement in fact
to trustee but held not restrictive, applying Florida law).
Of course, it can be argued that N. I. L. § 37, postamble, by selecting the title
of the first indorsee not the restricting indorser, indicates a difference, and that
therefore § 37 is not an exclusive listing of the indorsee's rights. Under § 196 the
law merchant would bring in the earlier cases, holding that only notice of the specific
equity of the cestui is given. It could also be argued that legislative support for this
interpretation can be found in Section 4 of -the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Cf. Landis,
Statutes and the Sources of Law, HAv. LEG. ESSAYS 213, 222 et seq. (1934).
101. UN FoRm FiDucmms ACT § 4.
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to inquire" and is "not chargeable with notice," the postamble to
N. I. L. Section 37 gives him only the title of his indorser. Ap-
parently, therefore, relief from duty of inquiry or from being charged
with notice is quite immaterial. 10 2
The problem of the indorsement "to A as agent for B," bank col-
lections apart, is essentially the same. A should not be limited to the
actions his indorser could bring, and a purchaser from A should be
able to qualify against prior parties as a holder in due course in his
own right if the sale by A is proper. The purchaser from A should,
in the absence of notice from sources other than the indorsement itself,
be entitled to assume that A's sale to him is rightful.1 3
Is the situation any different where the indorsement is to A in
trust for, or as agent of, the indorser? The purchaser from A should
be in the same position. Only actual notice of a breach of A's duty to
his cestui que trust or his principal should prevent the purchaser from
being a holder in due course. But as to A's rights against prior
parties, the factual situation may be quite different. Where the in-
dorser still has the full beneficial interest, the fiduciary should be
limited to any action his indorser could bring. In such a case the
fiduciary will have given no value to his indorser and therefore, even
as a special indorsee, would acquire no greater rights than his in-
dorser. 04 But an advance of money to the principal is not inconsistent
with being an agent, nor is it inconsistent for the factor to have a lien
on the principal's goods for his advances.' 05 In such a case where the
goods are negotiable instruments, the agent should be a holder in due
course to the extent of his lien.
102. Of course, arguments can be made that N. I. L. § 37 is not intended to be
exclusive, and that the word "negotiable" has several meanings in the Act and its use
in N. I. L. § 47 is in a narrow sense. See Smith, The Concept of "Negotiability", 7
Tax. L. REv. 520 (1929). Equally it can be argued that the words, "until it has been
restrictively indorsed," in Section 47 refer only to an indorsement under N. I. L.
§36(1). See Chafee, supra note 92, at 1211-1216 (1945).
103. See, e. g., UNIFOam F UcIARt s AcT §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, 9. The general integrity
of all fiduciaries entitles them to the benefit of the assumption, and the rule protecting
those dealing with a fiduciary's negotiable instruments, in the absence of actual knowl-
edge that such a transaction is unauthorized, will make proper dealing easier for honest
fiduciaries. The risk of loss is an honesty risk and, in view of the policy in favor of
free circulation of negotiable instruments, should be borne by those selecting the
fiduciary.
104. Cases such as First Nat. Bank v. John Morrell & Co., 53 S. D. 496, 221 N.
W. 95 (1928), could reach the same result on the theory that conditional or provisional
bank credit is not value. However, the same result has been reached in cases when
value was paid. Smith v. Bayer, 46 Ore. 143, 79 Pac. 497 (1905). The contrary
view has been reached where value was given to the restrictive indorser who was the
beneficiary of the indorsement on the theory that by accepting value he waived the
restrictive character of the indorsement, and so, apparently the words of restriction
could be stricken under N. I. L. §48. Continental Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stirling,
65 Idaho 123, 140 P. 2d 230 (1943) ; Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Palmetto Bank, 104
F. 2d 671 (4th Cir. 1939). The reasoning is not very satisfactory.
105. To avoid circuity of action the agent should not be permitted to recover more
than the amount of his advances.
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All of the arguments protecting the purchaser dealing directly with
the fiduciary apply a fortiori to remote indorsees. Such persons should
be entitled, in the absence of actual notice of something wrong, to
assume that the transaction between the fiduciary and their predecessor
in title was proper. Certainly the known integrity of most fiduciaries
makes such an assumption a reasonable one.
The Code, therefore, quite properly gives an indorsement to an
agent or trustee the full effect of a special indorsement to such per-
son, but although he has power to negotiate the instrument he remains
subject to his fiduciary obligation."' Thus, the question whether the
fiduciary can qualify as a holder in due course, or can by sale create
such a status in a purchaser, is referred to the sections dealing with
what constitutes a holder in due course and what facts constitute notice
to the purchaser. Here the Code adopts the approach of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, the purchaser is not put on notice by the mere fact
that he is dealing with a fiduciary; actual notice is required.
1 07
The Indorsement Prohibiting Further Transfer: The indorse-
ment, "pay to A only," is well handled under the N. I. L. It
creates a method whereby a holder can prevent the creation of a
subsequent holder in due course status which would cut off his
ownership rights. Chafee suggests that the indorsement "makes A
a sort of messenger boy to carry the instrument to the primary party
and bring back the cash." 108 But, it is submitted that the Code prop-
erly does not require A to do this physically. He can transfer the
instrument to others to do it for him, but there can be no new holder in
due course under such an indorsement, with one exception not material
here."09
106. "Section 207. INDORSEMENT TO AGENT OR IN TRUST.
"Unless it is for bank collection, an indorsement which states that it is for collec-
tion or to an agent in trust or otherwise for the benefit or the account of the
indorser or another named person has the full effect of a special indorsement to the
person named as indorsee, and he can further negotiate the instrument but remains
subject to any obligation as a fiduciary."
107. § 307(3) (c). "The purchaser has notice of a defect in the title when he has
reason to know . . . that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or
as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in
breach of duty."
§ 307(5) (e). "Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the pur-
chaser notice of an infirmity or defect . . . that any person negotiating the instru-
ment is or was a fiduciary."
108. Chafee, supra note 92, at 1201 n. 22.
109. "Section 205. CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT; PROHIBITING TRANSr=.
"Neither a conditional indorsement nor one purporting to prohibit further transfer
of the instrument prevents its further negotiation, and the holder may enforce payment
in disregard of the limitation; but after such an indorsement there can be no subse-
quent holder in due course and the indorsee or any subsequent holder takes the instru-
ment or its proceeds subject to any rights of the indorsee."
See also CODE § 716.
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The Indorsement for Bank Collection: Under the N. I. L. the
indorsement to a bank "for collection" was denominated restrictive,
and the cases were divided on the indorsements reading "for
deposit" or "pay any bank, banker or trust company." 10 Of
course, where "for account of" a third party was added to the in-
dorsement, N. I. L. Section 36(3) compelled a ruling that the
indorsement was restrictive. The Bank Collection Code specifically
makes the "for deposit" and the "pay any bank, banker or trust com-
pany" indorsements restrictive."' Under the N. I. L. it is difficult to
see how a bank taking under such an indorsement can become a holder
in due course in its own right. And this is correct where a bank takes
an instrument in its collection department, giving no credit to its
customer, or takes a cash item and posts a credit to its customer's ac-
count, but tells him not to draw against the credit until the item is
paid." 2 But the reason it is correct is because the bank has not paid
value. Where the bank in good faith pays value to its customer before
maturity of the instruments handled, no sound business reason appears
why it should be denied the rights of a holder in due course."' Value
may consist in permitting withdrawals against cash items or in ad-
vancing credit available for immediate withdrawal against the cus-
tomer's outstanding collections." 4  Yet a customer indorsing "for
deposit" or the like is properly entitled to protection against two types
of risk. First, he is entitled to protection against loss on the way to
the bank or against attempts by his employees to "cash" the items and
abscond with the proceeds." 5  This should be equally true where the
customer names no indorsee, but writes "for deposit" and signs his
name. Second, even where the customer has received value from his
110. The cases are collected in B~RroN, CASES ON BILLS AND Nors 148 n. 5-6
(1941).
111. BANIC CoLCTioN CODE § 4.
112. The Code, in the sections on bank collections adopts the position that pro-
visional credit is not value. Code §714(1). But cf. Note, Bank Credit as Value, 57
YALE L. J. 1149 (1948). Banks are quite insistent upon their right to dishonor instru-
ments drawn against uncollected funds and any claim of a value position, therefore,
comes with poor grace from them.
113. See the cases permitting restrictive wording to be stricken, supra note 104.
Cf. Atlantic City Nat. Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co., 107 N. J. L. 492, 155 Atl.
762 (1931) (reaching the same result on an estoppel theory). But cf. Cohen v. Fried-
berg, 56 A. 2d 571 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1948) (check cashing agency making advances
under agency arrangement for collection can not become holder in due course).
114. See Code §§ 714 and 720. Note, Bank Credit as Value: The Commercial
Code Article III, 57 YALE L. J. 1419 (1948).
115. Cf. Graham v. Southington Bank & Trust Co., 99 Conn. 494, 121 At. 812
(1923) (checks payable to bank cashed improperly-bank liable) ; Christian v. Calfor-
nia Bank, 30 Cal. 2d 421, 182 P. 2d 554 (1947) (bank put on notice by removal of
"for deposit" indorsement).
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bank, some limit must be placed on what his bank can do with the item.
Assume a demand note transferred by an indorsee customer to his
bank "for collection." The bank advances the full amount, against the
note pending collection. If we permit the bank to shift the financing
risk by selling the note to, or securing an advance from another bank,
it should only be from a bank which would handle the note in normal
course of collection."" Any other transfer would extend the time
required to make demand and consequently would extend the cus-
tomer's secondary liability, subjecting him to additional risks. Lip-
schutz v. Philadelphia Savings Fund Society,1 7 protecting a bank mak-
ing advances against deposited checks, can be considered properly de-
cided only because the record discloses that the protected bank regu-
larly handled the checks for the bank in which they were deposited;
thus the depositor received firm credit at an earlier date, and his con-
tingent liability risk was not extended.
The Code provides that the indorsement "for deposit" and the
like, accompanied by transfer to a bank locks the instrument in banking
channels,"' and the detailed regulation of bank collections found in
Part VII of Article III gives the depositor the protection discussed
above. Here again the Code avoids the difficulty of the concept of
the restrictive indorsement by not using the term.
116. Circuitous routing should be avoided. SPAHR, THE CLEARANCE AND COL-
LECTIoN OF CHEcKs 103 et seq. (1926).
117. 107 Pa. Super. 481, 164 Atl. 74 (1933). It is doubtful if depositors con-
sciously believe that they are stipulating for protection against the insolvency of their
bank by indorsing "for deposit." Further, if the "float" of uncollected checks is avail-
able for credit, timely advances to a bank with frozen assets may stave off insolvency.
The banking system functions when only a small portion of deposit balances are with-
drawn at one time. A bank failure generates runs on other banks. It is, therefore,
good social policy to prevent bank failures, and this may permit a weighing of this in-
terest against giving fullest possible protection of the depositor.
118. "Section 206. INDORSEMENT FOR BANK CoI ECioN.
"(1) An indorsement stating that it is 'for credit, 'for collection' or 'for deposit'
or the like and naming a bank as indorsee is an indorsement for bank collection. A
like indorsement naming no indorsee has the same effect when the instrument is trans-
ferred to a bank by or for the indorser.
"(2) After an instrument has been indorsed for bank collection no person may
become a holder in due course until the instrument has been transferred to the bank."
This section may be changed somewhat in scope by the current revisions but it is
believed that the basic policy will remain the same.
